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Financing elite education: proximity to capital and the 
maintenance of class power in and by private schools  
 
Dr Sol Gamsu, Department of Sociology, Durham University. 
Abstract 
 
The relationship of elite schools to economic capital is central to understanding the 
maintenance of their cultural power and institutional longevity. Since Glennerster and 
Wilson’s (1970) analysis, there has been little analysis of how private schools in England 
manage their wealth or how they are differentiated hierarchically by the composition and 
scale of the capital they hold. Research has explored the financing of elite universities 
(Spencer 2005; Piketty, 2014), with less attention on schools (James, Boden and Kenway 
Forthcoming). Using detailed Charities Commission financial data, I examine the finances of 
216 English private schools in the Head Masters’ Conference association. The analysis 
entails a Principal Components Analysis followed by a Hierarchical Clustering on the 
Principal Components to reveal the economic hierarchy amongst elite schools in England. I 
then draw on the schools’ published accounts to examine this hierarchy further. These 
analyses show how the economic field of elite schools is dominated by just five schools with 
almost unassailable levels of wealth in property, investments and fees. Beneath them sit a 
wealthy group with smaller capital holdings and more diverse incomes including lucrative 
satellite campuses in Asia. These wealthier schools are largely boarding schools located in 
southern England. The provincial day schools of northern England and less prestigious 
boarding schools have much lower incomes and almost total reliance on tuition fees. 
Proximity to and control over capital allow schools to maintain their dominance, underlining 









Wealth and economic capital are central to the formation of elites but within the sociology of 
elite education this perspective has been neglected. An understanding of the multiple and 
complex ways that cultures and practices of elite and middle-class identities are formed and 
the institutional context for this has been the core focus of this literature (Ball, 2015, p. 237). 
Research has consistently shown the link between private schooling and elite status 
(Reeves et al., 2017) and Green et al. (2017, p. 27) have shown how those attending fee-
paying schools disproportionately come from the top 5% of the income distribution. In this 
paper, I provide a theoretical understanding and an empirical analysis of the economic 
hierarchy between elite (fee-paying) schools in England. I examine how proximity to and 
control over economic capital at an institutional scale are associated with cultural and 
symbolic prestige, histories of capital accumulation and varying degrees of economic 
stability. 
 
Understanding these neglected ‘material aspects’ of elite education research (Ball, 2015, p. 
237) has a deeper empirical and political point: the educational institutions of the ruling and 
middle class are, to varying degrees, determined by their proximity to economic capital. This 
sometimes involves brutal processes of exploitation and inequality. Schools like Eton and 
Rugby educated many Caribbean slaveowners’ sons (Williams, 1944, p. 92); Bristol 
Grammar (Guasco, 2014, p. 92), Colston School (Steeds, 2020) and Dollar Academy (2019) 
were all founded with endowments from slaveowners and Trinity College Cambridge 
invested in the firm that put combustible cladding on Grenfell Tower (Adams and 
Greenwood2018). These examples link certain elite educational institutions very directly to 
violent forms of capital accumulation.  
 
This paper situates an analysis of elite education within a broader intellectual and political 
project of unveiling how class power is maintained and reproduced within education. This 
means understanding how the economic capital that is central to the functioning of elite fee-
paying schools is maintained, managed, created and accumulated. Education is the key site 
of capital conversion for individuals (Bourdieu, 1986). Examining the mechanics of school 
finances and the relationship between elite schooling and (economic) capital allows us to 
peer behind the cultural ‘mystique of ivy covered walls’ (Joyce, 2013, p. 300) and observe 
the institutional relationship to capital that facilitates the social reproduction of the ruling and 
middle class through education. This paper works on the hypothesis that individual 
processes of capital conversion are enabled and mirrored by institutional processes which 
convert wealth into material forms of cultural capital in the shape of lavish sporting, cultural 
and educational spaces (Gamsu, 2016).   
 
This paper maps the material economic basis for the educational formation of elites by 
analysing the economic hierarchies within the English field of elite schools. These schools 
benefit from many forms of cultural, legislative support, principally through influencing the 
state (Boden, Kenway, & James, 2020; Lowe, 2020); privately-educated ruling elites have 
historically protected these schools’ financial interests. Whilst these processes have created 
the conditions for the financially advantageous position of these ‘charitable’ schools, they do 
not allow us to understand the different income streams of different schools. Nor do they 
allow us to distinguish the hierarchy in wealth and capital that exists between these schools. 
This paper concentrates on the latter, providing an initial mapping of these schools’ wealth. 
Whilst wealth management of elite universities has a significant literature (Acharya & 
Dimson, 2007; Eaton et al., 2016), with few exceptions, this is not true for the financing of 
elite schools. This paper seeks to fill this lacuna. 
 
An ‘under-acknowledged’ aspect of the sociology of elite education (Kenway & Koh, 2015, p. 
4) is how elite schooling is embedded in the economic functioning of global capitalism. 
Recentring on the relationships between capital, capitalism and power in education 
refocuses class analysis in education. How are power relations in elite education bound to 
capitalism? What knowledge can be gained by studying how these relations work? And how 
can we make this useful beyond the realms of academic study? This paper is situated within 
a broader project to frame and do the sociology of elites within a politics that seeks to 
contest, and ultimately abolish, elite power in education (Gamsu, 2019, 2020b, 2021a). 
There is a broader point here for the sociology of class, more specifically the sociology of 
elites, and schooling. Stripping back the cultural veneer, symbolic mystique and power of 
these institutions back to its economic basis is an act of demystification. It allows us to see 
how institutions that dominate the field of schooling are maintained through and in relation to 
economic capital; we can reveal the economic underpinnings which reproduce the 
dominance of elite schools and examine the economic hierarchy between them. Stripping 
back the power of these schools to its economic dimension is one way to highlight the 
sometimes elusive origins and causes of these schools’ dominance (Denord, Palme, & 
Réau, 2020, p. 6). 
This analysis of the economic field of institutions shows how a tiny minority of institutions 
hold wealth on a vast scale. These are the institutions that are closest to capital; capital 
accumulation is central to their history, present and future. They are also amongst the most 
prestigious and famous schools. It is no coincidence that those schools that are closest to 
capital dominate not only the field of elite schooling but educate those who have historically 
ruled Britain and its former empire. Beneath them sits a slightly larger wealthy subgroup and 
then a larger set of comparatively poorer institutions. Access to diverse income streams 
and/or accumulated investment wealth overlaps with traditional geographical, gendered and 
educational divides to reinforce hierarchy within the field of elite English private schools.  
 
This paper proceeds in four stages. Firstly, it provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding the relationship between economic capital and elite schools. I then review the 
literature on the financing of education, noting the more extensive research on relationships 
between capital, finance in elite universities as opposed to schools. The main analysis of the 
paper follows with a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and cluster analysis of elite 
schools’ economic resources allowing us to map four hierarchical positions within the field of 
elite schools in England. This uses a unique financial dataset covering 216 private schools in 
the prestigious Headmasters’ Conference (HMC) group of private schools. Lastly, I examine 
schools’ individual accounts in four field positions. The definition of elite schools 
operationalised here focusses on their fee-paying status and their historic role in educating 
the middle and upper/ruling class or elite (Baron, 1955; Gamsu, 2020a; Rubinstein, 1986).  
 
Mastering capital and time: theorizing institutional wealth and schooling  
 
To understand the functioning of (economic) capital at an institutional scale in education, a 
Bourdieusian lens is an important point of departure but not, on its own, sufficient. Bourdieu 
(1986) succinctly outlines the processes of accumulation and conversion of economic into 
cultural and social capital in education. Elsewhere he also outlines the strategies and 
hierarchies within the institutional field of elite French higher education (HE) that allow 
institutions to accumulate and sustain capital (Bourdieu, 1996). Theorizing the role of 
economic capital in allowing elite schools to dominate requires a broader range of 
references.  
Longevity and history are in themselves important markers of prestige for elite schools 
(Gaztambide-Fernández, 2009; Kenway et al., 2017), but age reflects a deeper and more 
important element of how power is constructed in and through elite schools. Elite schools 
aim to create/maintain advantage their students’ futures, but they also aim to continue and 
maintain the school’s institutional position. Time itself is deeply implicated in the creation of 
class power:  
There is no barrier more insurmountable than time[…] and all social bodies use it to 
maintain an order of succession,[…], in other words, to maintain the distances that 
must be kept,[…], because they are constitutive of the social order[…] so many social 
ranks that are very often distinguished by nothing but time.  
(Original emphasis. Bourdieu, 1996, p. 333) 
Bourdieu refers here to inheritance and reproduction of status as maintained through the 
passing of time. This allows an opening to consider how elite educational institutions relate 
to time. The temporal range of an elite educational institution, the period over which it seeks 
to maintain and enhance its position, extends far beyond the working lives of students or 
teachers. Formal autonomy from the state means the primary risk to these schools is 
financial instability. Money permits greater time and control for decision-making when faced 
with uncertainty; it allows institutions to manage risk (Konings, 2018, p. 140; Shackle, 1988, 
p. 277). Wealth management and profitability are essential to their control over time.  
We can thus begin to theorize the position and relation of elite schooling to wealth. Derrida 
reminds us of Marx’s emphasis of the spectral and morbid qualities of capital:  
‘Marx then describes, whether it is a question of money or of ideologems, it is a 
production of ghosts, illusions, simulacra, appearances, or apparitions[…]. Later he 
will compare this spectral virtue of money with that which, in the desire to hoard, 
speculates on the use of money after death[…].’  
(Derrida, 2006, p. 56) 
This spectral quality of capital, the morbid speculation on, and accumulation of, wealth on 
such a scale that it lasts far beyond an individual’s life, underlines the temporal divisions 
highlighted by Bourdieu above. Money and value are bound to time. The speculative 
relationship to wealth and value that is central to capitalism mean that capital is constantly 
organised around the commitment to creating further wealth, it is intrinsically bound to ‘an 
ever-receding horizon’ (Konings, 2018, 23). Elite educational institutions are engaged 
precisely in the construction of the same form of control and power over time which relies on 
the successful management of capital. These institutions also bind themselves to a 
continuous forward movement. Their fundraising efforts emphasise precisely the ‘ever-
receding horizon’ of their continuing success and dominance; the magical qualities of age, 
history, luxurious architecture and cultural facilities. Crucially, the control over past, present 
and future are bound up in their relation to capital.  
 
These schools are historically bound to the past and present creation of wealth, both in their 
foundation (original endowments) and institutional activity (tuition fees, fundraising, wealth-
management). Having provided a theoretical analysis linking institutional dominance to the 
functioning of capital and time, we now turn to the empirical literature on wealth 
management amongst elite educational institutions. 
 
The financing and economics of elite education – ‘unto every one that hath shall be 
given, and he shall have abundance’ 
 
The wealthiest, most prestigious educational institutions find it easier to accumulate further 
wealth. This is explained in the literature on wealth management and philanthropy in 
American HE. Ostrower (1995, p. 90) found that those from the most selective educational 
institutions are also the most likely to attract larger donations from wealthy donors. Similarly, 
Piketty (2014, pp. 447-452) shows how investment returns are highest for institutions with 
the largest endowments. Underpinning this is the simple fact of economies of scale, the 
wealthiest institutions can afford the best portfolio managers who gain higher returns. The 
Matthew effect amongst academic institutions (Merton, 1968, p. 162) is underpinned by its 
economic equivalent. Materially and structurally, the accumulation of cultural and symbolic 
capital necessary to dominate the field of educational institutions is tied to economic capital. 
This often symbolically, and sometimes physically (as noted above with slavery and 
Grenfell), violent reality, binds cultural prestige to processes of exploitation that are integral 
to forms of capital accumulation within capitalism.  
 
The broader literature exploring the mechanisms behind institutional financial management 
has largely focussed on universities. Economic geographers have examined increasing 
philanthropy in universities (Warren, Hoyler, & Bell, 2014) and charted the changing holdings 
of Oxbridge colleges in agricultural/urban land, securities and investments (Spencer, 2000). 
There is also a more ‘practitioner’-oriented literature exploring the mechanical and strategic 
approaches to investments and endowments (Acharya & Dimson, 2007; Cejnek et al.2014). 
A more critical literature looks at university finances through the lens of financialization and 
marketisation (Eaton et al., 2016; Samuels, 2011). Stein (2020) explores how the foundation 
of educational institutions is connected to histories of capital accumulation, colonial conquest 
and land dispossession. Analyses the financing and relationship of universities to the 
broader political economy is both more extensive and more critical than research on elite 
school finances. 
The literature on the financing of UK private schools is scant and largely focusses on 
empirical analyses without theoretical framing. The most notable work is Glennerster and 
Wilson’s (1970) book which resulted from financial surveys undertaken for the 1968 
Donnison/Newsom Public Schools Commissions.  Glennerster and Wilson (1970, pp. 49-53) 
show how UK private schools rely on fee income with only 17 schools receiving a substantial 
income share from endowments. This paper updates their analysis of income variation, 
observing hierarchies and clusters amongst elite schools. The data used here is publicly 
available allowing us to identify institutions. 
 
More recent work has been less detailed than Glennerster and Wilson (1970) and has 
lacked any theorization of capital. Graddy and Stevens (2005) looked at the effects of private 
school resources on attainment and found that fees were positively correlated with A-level 
results and negatively correlated with pupil-teacher ratios. However, like Bee and Dolton 
(1985), they found that once prior attainment is controlled for, capital spending has little 
effect on school attainment. The most recent paper finds a positive association between 
higher fees and attainment at 18 (Davies & Davies, 2014). Focussing on attainment when 
these schools’ intake is already highly socially selective, and given that higher income 
private schools are more likely to spend more on employing non-teaching staff (Davies & 
Davies, 2014, p. 434), may suggest that the advantages provided by greater income do not 
map simply onto attainment. It seems likely that economic largesse may be associated with 
less measurable advantages, not least the formation of a habitus comfortable with elite 
architectural and social spaces and practices. 
 
Data and methodology 
 
The main analysis involves a PCA of Charities Commission (CC) accounts data. This 
includes 216 HMC member schools. The HMC is a historical association of high-status UK 
private schools formed in the late 19th century to protect their interests and financial 
independence as schools for the Victorian ruling and middle classes. The association still 
includes most of the more expensive and socially-selective private schools.  
The sample represents most of the HMC (216/291). CC data includes English and some 
Welsh Schools. For consistency I have only included English HMC schools here, excluding 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish schools. Several HMC members are in large school 
groups based on faith or gender (e.g., United Church Schools Trust, Girls’ Public Day School 
Trust). The charities funding these schools do not disaggregate individual schools, making it 
impossible to examine institutional finances. These schools were excluded. This does not 
significantly affect numbers of girls/boys schools (19 Boys, 22 Girls, 175 Mixed).  
Financial data here is for 2017-18 (CC 2020). Charity numbers were collected by hand. Data 
was then merged with Department for Education (2020) data providing data on student 
numbers and school type. All data analysed is published under Open Government License 
(National Archives, 2014). Data was analysed in R using ‘FactoMineR’ (Lê, Josse, & 
Husson, 2008). 
 
PCA allows us to explore how schools are positioned according to their characteristics. 
Where we have more than two continuous variables, a simple scatterplot will not allow us to 
examine relationships between many variables (Carlson, 2017, p. 265). PCA allows us to 
examine the inter-relationship of multiple variables simultaneously. This works by deriving 
variables called Principal Components (PCs), which transform the original scores to 
maximize the amount of variance explained, this is repeated until all the variance is 
explained. The PCs are defined by the ‘loadings’ or the contribution of particular variables to 
the PC (Bro & Smilde, 2014, p. 2820). Each PC helps suggest the structure of the data, 
allowing us to understand hierarchies and groupings within it. Taking the first two PCs, as is 
done here, will often explain the largest amount of variance.  
In our case the active variables that are used to construct the PCs are the economic 
variables in the CC dataset (See Table 1). These cover various sources of income, the 
composition of that income (percentages), loans (short and long-term) and expenditure. 
There is more limited/less informative expenditure data. I have focussed here on total 
expenditure and investment expenditure, with the latter variable allowing us to examine the 
association highlighted by Piketty between greater investment wealth and payments to 
investment managers. Fixed investment assets indicate the total investment capital held; 
current assets show other forms of cash assets. The variables chosen were selected to 
disaggregate the different approaches to financial management.  
Excluding income percentages, all the active variables are pounds per pupil (pp). 
Supplementary variables can also be included in PCA (Lê et al., 2008, p. 3). These do not 
contribute to the construction of the PCs but are projected into the space using the same 
method for continuous variables. These supplementary quantitative variables are 
Employee:pupil ratio, income diversity index (HHI), percentage of students attending 
Oxbridge in 2017 (the last publicly available data), the number of students at Oxford/ 
Cambridge in 1867 (using Government Commission data). These latter measures give an 
idea of contemporary entry to elite universities as well as a historic measure of 19th century 
elite status (Steedman 1987). For categorical supplementary variables for each PC, we 
calculate the position of the ‘mean individual’ for schools with certain characteristics 
(regions, boarding/day, girls/boys/mixed school).  
Before doing the PCA I first transformed and standardized the active variables for the 
analysis. PCA is particularly sensitive to outliers with single individuals (Chen, Bandoni, & 
Romagnoli, 1996, p. 3563); normalization and standardization of are thus not uncommon 
(Baxter, 1995). In this data the role of a small number of extremely wealthy schools (Eton, 
Christ’s Hospital, Rugby and Winchester) disproportionately influence the PC’s, particularly 
with data left untransformed. However, running the analyses without these schools does not 
substantially change the axes, other (slightly less) wealthy schools have similar effects. As 
most variables are positively skewed but also contain large numbers of zeros, as is common 
for wealth data (Friedline, Masa, & Chowa, 2015), the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) 
transformation was used for most variables. Four variables received other appropriate 
transformations (specific transformations are shown with variable suffix - Fig. 2); all active 
variables were standardized with z-scores following transformation.  
 
I complement and expand the PCA analysis with a cluster analysis allowing us to further 
nuance our understanding of the field . This cluster analysis uses the PCA as a ‘pre-
processing step’ with the principal components used to help define the clusters (Husson, 
Josse, & Pages, 2010). This approach, Hierarchical Clustering on Principal Components, 
combines PCA, hierarchical clustering and the k-means algorithm to refine our 
understanding of multivariate datasets like this one (Maugeri, Barchitta, Basile, & Agodi, 
2021). 
 
A skewed field: the uneven accumulation of capital amongst elite schools in 
England 
 
Glancing at the descriptives (Table 1) below shows the skewed nature of the data, 
underlining the inequalities within the field. On average, these private schools had 3.7 times 
the income per pupil of local state schools (Gamsu, 2021b). Legacy, endowment and 
investment income are all relatively small for most schools, only the wealthiest 25% or less 
gain significant sums through these means. Voluntary income (often donations) is slightly 
more substantial across these schools, with a median income per pupil of £245.  Most 
schools rely on school fees or ‘charitable’ income. 
 
These descriptive statistics suggest a hierarchical set of relations to capital. The central 
division here is between schools that rely overwhelmingly on fees and those with more 
diverse incomes. This may also mirror a broader range of hierarchical positions within the 
field of schooling in England: geographical location, specifically proximity to South-East 
England’s cultural and economic power (Cunningham and Savage, 2015), boys’ schools - 
historically wealthier than girls’, and the more expensive boarding schools. Fee reliance also 
suggests greater vulnerability to economic change as pressure on family incomes would 
likely affect these schools’ finances (Gamsu, 2020a).  
 
We might suggest a broader theoretical link here between institutional hierarchies and 
economic capital. The hierarchy between elite schools has always been relational and 
shifting (Honey, 1977). The less wealthy schools in this study rely on school fees making 
them more exposed to reputational damage or academic competition from state schools. In 
contrast, schools with large capital wealth and/or other income streams possess deeper 
economic support for the construction of symbolic and cultural educational power. The 
substantial institutional wealth held by a minority of schools sets a particular benchmark 
relationship to capital; this is the apex of the system and symbolic and cultural prestige is 
mirrored and underpinned by their close proximity to and control over economic capital. 
Stripping the cultural power of these schools back to its economic basis allows us to see 
how capital conversion at the individual scale is paralleled and aided by capital conversion at 
the institutional scale (Gamsu, 2016). This also underlines how institutional hierarchies, and 
public perceptions/cultural understandings of what educational ‘excellence’ means, is 
ultimately strongly associated with economic capital. We now examine this hierarchy through 
the PCA and cluster analysis.  
 







Principal Components’ Analysis 
 
The PCA analysis shown below allows us to understand the field positions of elite schools in 
relation to their economic capital. Using PCA methods, we can examine the relational 
construction of economic hierarchies within the field. In keeping with a Bourdieusian 
approach to quantitative analysis, the conceptualization of hierarchy as a relational field 
overlaps with the statistical method (Lebaron, 2009, pp. 12-13). We discuss four hierarchical 
positions present within the field suggested by the PCA. 
 
Figures 1-2 and Tables 2-3 allow us to understand the construction of the two PCs. The x 
axis represents the first PC which accounts for 34.37% of the variance. In order of 
contribution (≥5%) to PC and all positively correlated unless noted, the variables shaping this 
PC are total income, total expenditure, charitable income, investment income, percentage 
charitable income (negatively correlated), voluntary income, loans due in year, current 
assets, percentage voluntary income, investment expenditure/income percentage/assets. 
What this suggests is that schools with positive scores on the x axis/PC1 have larger income 
and expenditure per pupil with diverse income streams. Schools with negative scores on 
PC1 have lower and less diverse incomes, with fees constituting a larger proportion of total 
income. The supplementary variables reinforce this with the HHI index being negative 
correlated to PC1, as is the pupil:employee ratio with schools with higher numbers of pupils 
per employee located on the left of the graph. The Oxbridge supplementary variables are 
both positively correlated but this is much more the case for the 1867 data which is positively 
correlated and better projected on PC1.  
 
The second dimension/PC2 (y-axis) accounts for 14.9% of the variation. PC2 is constructed 
through (again ≥5%, correlation in brackets) charitable income (negative), loans due in year 
(negative), investment income percentage (positive), endowment income (positive), 
expenditure (negative), endowment income percentage (positive), total income (negative), 
trading income (negative), trading income percentage (negative). This divides those schools 
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We can further disaggregate these schools by applying a hierarchical cluster analysis to the 
PCA data; this allows us to cluster individuals across the active variables whilst also using 
the PCs to define the clusters (Husson et al., 2010). These clusters are projected below (Fig. 
4) onto the same dimensions as above. 
This approach further nuances our understanding of the economic hierarchy between these 
schools and allows us to incorporate the supplementary variables more easily to describe 
the clusters. The top right quadrant contains a tiny sub-group of five schools with extreme 
capital wealth (cluster 4) whilst the other schools in the top right quadrant with significant 
endowment/investment wealth are closer to schools in the top left or bottom right quadrant or 
clusters 2 and 3 respectively. We can now examine the characteristics of these clusters 
further (Tables 4 and 5). 
  
Figure 4 




Tables 4 and 5 show the statistically significant variables that define and distinguish the 
clusters. We will examine their characteristics in descending order of overall wealth (cluster 
4 to 1). Cluster 4 is a tiny, extremely wealthy subset that also heavily determine the PCA 
(very large contributions to PC1 and PC2). Across the full range of income types, and 
especially those associated with investment and other forms of capital wealth, cluster 4 has 
substantially higher averages than the overall group. It has on average just 2 pupils per 
employee, very diverse income (average HHI 0.49), very high historic numbers of students 
at Oxbridge (72 on average vs nine in cluster 3, three in both clusters 1 and 2) and the 
highest average percentage of students (9%) attending Oxbridge in 2017 (5% cluster 3, 5% 
cluster 2, 3% cluster 1). This is the old elite and their vast, historical wealth determines the 
field and the dominating position within it. The small numbers mean the categorical variables 
cannot be interpreted for cluster 4.  
 
Cluster 3 is overwhelmingly (94%) boarding schools which are primarily co-educational 
(72%). The South-East (38% of the cluster) is the only region that has a statistically 
significant association with this grouping. These schools are generally above average for 
income and expenditure, income from investments is also above average but notably less so 
than for Cluster 4. They have considerably larger than average trading incomes, which we 
examine further below as this reflects careful cultivation of alternative income streams. 
Pupils per employee is also very low. 
 
Cluster 2 are the poorer day schools, just over half of all day schools in the sample are in 
this group and 78% of the cluster are day schools. These are provincial schools, with a large 
north-western group (68% of schools in North-West England are in this cluster), they have 
above average numbers of pupils per employee (4.5). These schools have smaller debts 
due in year and tend to have lower/no long-term debt unlike the wealthier schools on the 
right who appear to have much greater access to credit. This parallels recent trends in 
university finance where wealthier universities have greater access to loans on better terms 
(McGettigan, 2013). Key income variables (total income/expenditure pp, charitable income 
pp) are all notably lower than the overall average.  
The other cluster, cluster 1 forms the majority of the bottom left quadrant. They are largely 
boarding schools (54/88), geographically heterogeneous but with a generally southern skew 
(73% in SE/SW/East/London). They have low levels of income diversity and below average 
total income and expenditure, whilst it is not significant in the cluster analysis, the PCA 
suggests that schools positioned here also have a high reliance on fees with charitable 
income a large percentage of income. Cluster 1 schools also have below average (mean) 
Oxbridge attendance in 2017 (2.8%) and 1867 (3 students) compared to schools in the field 
as a whole (mean for 2017 – 4.3%, 1867 – 6 students). This suggests they are lower 
prestige institutions with reduced financial resources relative to the dominant boarding 
schools of clusters 3 and 4.  
 
 
To summarise then, combining these statistical analyses suggests four major field positions 
within the economic hierarchy of private schools in England: 
Top left: Fee reliant day schools. Mostly northern co-educational schools with higher 
numbers of pupils per employee. Some have very small endowment/investment 
income. Lowest incomes pp. 
Bottom left: Fee-reliant boarding schools. Geographically diverse, mostly co-
educational. Low income diversity. 
Bottom right: Wealthy, income-diverse exclusively southern boarding schools. 
Greater fee reliance, some with considerable trading incomes. The older, more 
famous boarding schools. 
Top right: Capital rich, mostly southern boarding schools. High income and 
expenditure, considerable investment/endowment income. Includes smaller subset of 
schools with vast capital wealth. 
 
 
Cluster 4 - The unassailable wealthy elite: managing large capital wealth 
 
At the apex of the private school system, a handful institutions have vast wealth and income, 
allowing them substantial financial security. These institutions, like some Oxbridge Colleges, 
have such substantial wealth-holdings that they are effectively in an unassailable class of 
their own. The dominant elite institutions that set the rules of the game in education are 
strongly bound to (economic) capital; we can only hypothesize here on how institutions use 
this wealth but proximity to capital appears strongly related to educational power and 
domination. With the partial exception of Latymer Upper, the schools in cluster 4 are 
essentially investment vehicles that happen to provide educational services. These schools 
are financialized, not as a site where capital can be accumulated for others, as is the case in 
state school systems under the academy or charter school model (Sanders, 2018; Whitfield, 
2016), but rather as institutions that wield and accumulate capital themselves to ensure their 
own dominance. Looking at their CC accounts for 2017-18, Eton College (2018, p. 13) held 
investments worth £350.1m with a further £86.4m in property, Christ’s Hospital (2018, p. 7) 
held securities and other financial assets of £255m and £160.8m in property, Winchester 
College’s (2018, p. 26) investment income is primarily from (rural) property, valued at 
£268m, Rugby School (2018, p. 25) held a combined investments of £137.1m, (mostly 
property). This capital income allows them substantial economic power. Ignoring fee income, 
their investments, fundraising and endowments easily equals, and for Eton and Christ’s 
Hospital easily surpasses, the income of most state secondary schools. 
The other schools in the top right quadrant are dwarfed by these four boarding schools. The 
other school in this cluster, Latymer Upper, has the largest endowment income pp of any of 
the schools here, receiving over £3000pp. In its 2017-18 accounts, Latymer Upper had 
investments worth £51m, managed by Smith and Williamson primarily for bursaries. Smith 
and Williamson managed the offshore investment vehicle established by David Cameron’s 
late father as revealed in the Panama Papers (Simpson, 2016); capital accumulation by the 
British ruling class as individuals and for its schools, runs through the same hands. Latymer 
Upper also has very high voluntary income (over £8m or £5806pp).  
 
Most of the schools listed here have organized fundraising activities, and for some this is 
highly effective. Latymer Upper (2018, pp. 2, 9) is typical in stating that the formalization of 
fundraising occurred around the year 2000 when state-funded Assisted Places were phased 
out (Manchester Grammar School Foundation, 2017, p. 4). Fundraising for bursaries, 
growing the endowment or for sports facilities/new buildings/renovation are all common. This 
is a highly strategic with the Institute of Development Professionals in Education (IDPE), 
founded in 1998, providing regular reports and analysis of effective fundraising strategies. 
Unsurprisingly, older, larger, better-funded development offices tend to have higher yields so 
it is not surprising that the schools earning over £5000pp in voluntary income are, in 
descending order, Winchester College, Chetham’s School of Music, Eton, Harrow & John 
Lyon, Christ’s Hospital and Latymer Upper.   
 
A comprehensive analysis of the source of school donations is beyond this paper, but we 
can provide initial hints. Latymer Upper list all donors that have contributed to their current 
fundraising campaign, aiming to fundraise £40m for the 400th anniversary of the school in 
2024. In 2019, this list included 2132 individuals of whom 288 were contributing over £2024 
pa qualifying them as members of the “1624 Society”. Taking 20 members of the 1624 
Society at random and looking at companies house records, we can see these are often 
individuals in senior professional/managerial occupations (senior lawyers, senior academics, 
real estate directors), with 8/20 working in banking or investment, some of whom hold 
substantial private fortunes, as well as some individuals that have likely inherited wealth from 
and/or worked in multi-million or billion dollar family businesses. The proximity to capital in 
this small sample of donors further underlines the centrality of capital and finance to the 
maintenance and creation of prestige and power in education.  
Fundraising also highlights the relationship between time and capital. There are many 
examples of fundraising associated with anniversaries: £10m by 2015 for the 500th 
anniversary of Manchester Grammar, £40m by 2024 for 400 years for Latymer Upper, and 
on a grand scale Cambridge University’s 800th anniversary - over £1bn in five years.  These 
campaigns underline how history, time, capital accumulation and educational power 
intertwine. The narratives of these campaigns weave together institutional history, personal 
educational biography, experience and memory with financial wealth and the need to 
preserve, maintain and extend the institution into the future. Major gifts and legacies have 
been shown to be the most profitable element of private school fundraising activities (IDPE 
and Graham Pelton, 2018, p. 16). This is a targeted process with more established schools 
keeping databases of ‘major prospects, i.e. a person able to donate at least the minimum 
value of a major gift’ (Ibid. p. 17). Legacy income is a powerful reminder that capital allows 
existence beyond death; individuals’ economic success, partly due to their elite education, 
contributes to sustaining their former school. Their names live on in named scholarships, 
buildings or specific funds for the school’s students. The spectral, morbid and magical quality 
of capital is present here. History and time are woven together, combining the profitable 
working lives of former pupils, the institutional life of the school, which must survive beyond 
them, and the capital which will allow it to do so. Fundraising is another means by which 
these schools bind themselves to capital, keeping wealthy donors close and tracking the 
source of future donations through engagement and alumni networks. Whilst schools in 
clusters 4 and 3 are particularly successful at fundraising, these strategies and practices are 
found across the clusters.  
 
Cluster 3 - Elite schools with diversified income streams 
 
The schools are mostly concentrated in the bottom right quadrant have some very high 
incomes but with smaller endowment/investment wealth than cluster 4. Strategies for 
maintaining profitability are generally more diverse in these schools. This grouping includes 
many of the older, better-known boarding schools which partly explains why their charitable 
incomes are so large, as boarding fees are substantially higher (£20k higher than day school 
fees in 2018). The larger schools mentioned here also operate fundraising campaigns and 
hold their own investments though generally these provide much smaller incomes, mostly in 
the hundreds of thousands with only Marlborough College earning over £1m through 
investments. 
Several of the schools in this wealthy but less capital rich grouping are involved in overseas 
franchising/partnerships to open satellite campuses. Bunnell et al. (2020, p. 18) suggest that 
older schools like Eton, St Paul’s, Winchester may not have got involved as they do not have 
the same financial need as others. This appears to be borne out here. Of the named schools 
in the bottom right quadrant (Fig. 1) the following schools have satellites (earnings from 
CC/Companies House accounts in brackets) Harrow (£3.035m), Sherborne School 
(overseas company still repaying loan from school), Marlborough (Income to school unclear, 
company’s surplus: £5.1m) and Wellington College (£1.4m). The financial arrangements 
underpinning these incomes are complex and vary substantially and external investors are 
also involved (Bunnell et al., 2020, pp. 15-16; Sandgren, 2017, p. 208). These satellite 
schools are both profitable for the UK schools and allow healthy returns to private investors. 
Branding and reputation becomes a form of wealth creation – the sale of reputation now 
occurs transnationally underlining how proximity to economic capital and innovative forms of 
commodification are central to these ‘charitable’ schools. 
 
Clusters 1 and 2: The “poorer” provincial day and boarding schools 
 
At the lower end of the economic field of elite schools, we find the day schools of northern 
England and parts of the Midlands concentrated in the top left or cluster 2. This spatial 
hierarchy is not entirely accidental but rather reflects the contemporary and historical 
economic and social geography of capital and elites within England (Cunningham & Savage, 
2015). The uneven development of the economy in the UK finds its corollary in the economic 
geography of private schooling. We will explore this geography briefly here. This serves to 
underline the spatial, social and economic differentiation of private school systems in the 
South-East of England (including London) and elsewhere (Gamsu, 2020a). What really 
distinguishes schools in the North from those in the South, and especially the South-East, is 
the absence of super-wealthy or wealthy boarding schools alongside a more diverse sector 
of private day schools. There are less wealthy private day schools in the South-East, 
Lingfield College in Surrey being one example, but these sit alongside a larger number of 
much wealthier schools that are less common in northern England. Proximity to capital has 
regional dimensions for these schools which reflect the broader spatial structure of the 
English economy. 
 
These schools do not have substantial investments of their own. Incomes from investments 
are in the tens of thousands as opposed to the hundreds of thousands or even millions. St 
Mary’s Crosby held £1.18m producing an income of £19,136. However, whilst these schools 
operate are situated a far cry from the apex of the wealth of the dominant institutions within 
the field, their incomes are still significantly larger than local state-funded secondaries. 
Though it had the lowest income pp in this analysis St Mary’s Crosby it was still higher 
(£8477pp) than local state schools (£5878pp) (Gamsu, 2021b). Located just outside 
Liverpool, it nearly became a state school in 2014/15 because of the difficulties parents 
faced in affording fees. Unlike in cluster 4 and likely in cluster 3, the wealth held by parents 
using schools in cluster 1 is much reduced; for St Mary’s Crosby and other similar schools 
this form of distance from capital makes their viability and stability as private schools 
precarious (Gamsu, 2020a).  
 
At the lower end of the private school system, provincial day schools which are locally 
prestigious and ‘elite’ rely almost exclusively on smaller fee incomes. They may share similar 
cultural practices with the apex of the system but they are economically far closer to state 
schools. We can only speculate here, but it seems likely that their intake is also much less 
socially exclusive given the lower fees charged by day schools outside London. This would 
also fit with a theoretical and historical understanding of the role of elite schools in England 
within the class structure: that of joining the middle and ruling classes or elite within what 
appears to be a culturally unified system of private schooling. In fact, the proximity/relation to 
capital for both the families and the schools involved varies substantially. 
 
Cluster 1 are largely southern institutions (73% from London/South-East/South-West/East 
England) with the majority (61%) being boarding schools. Schools that are closest to the 
centre of this cluster include provincial boarding schools like West Buckland School and day 
schools like the Grammar School at Leeds (GSAL). These are schools with middling low-
diversity incomes, reliant on fees but with incomes that are higher than cluster 2. These fee 
incomes are still much lower than other more affluent day/boarding schools in the South-
East. These are mostly schools with minimal investment incomes, but higher fee incomes 
than cluster 2 due to boarding provision. West Buckland held long-term investments worth 
just £136,234 in 2017-18, GSAL held investments/stocks totaling just £45,000. West 
Buckland took an HSBC loan of £4.5m to build a new library and boarding house/6th form; 
the loan was arranged assuming ‘only a steady rate of growth, recognizing that it operates in 
a remote area… with a niche [boarding] catchment’. This school relies overwhelmingly on 
fees (97% of income). Compare this to a boarding school like Tonbridge in cluster 3, which 
received a £6m loan from the school’s associated charitable foundation for a new science 
centre and held HSBC-managed investments worth £5.4m. With a few exceptions, notably 
Repton, Bedales and King’s College School, cluster 1 schools, are less famous nationally 
and have middling incomes. These schools rely heavily on fees, which is their key unifying 
factor. 
Conclusion – proximity to capital and the maintenance of class power in and 
by elite schools 
 
In the annual reports of the private schools just examined, the first few pages give long lists 
of educational achievements: success in sports, essay writing/debating competitions and 
examinations. These are followed, usually directly, by an account of the school’s income. 
The economics of these schools form the material basis for the symbolic and cultural 
prestige that is accumulated by young people and these schools. This paper has provided 
an initial survey of how processes of capital conversion occurs at an institutional scale. More 
research is needed to look at the mechanics of this in greater depth than has been possible 
here.  
 
Proximity to and control over capital is central to elite formation and reproduction. When we 
strip away the ornate historic architecture, the sporting and academic prowess and the 
embodied confidence and snobbery that these schools foster, we are left with brute 
economic inequality. For the schools analysed here, proximity to capital – the ownership of 
substantial wealth, or effective proximity to wealthy individuals, or the capacity to create 
alternative sources of income streams varies both spatially and institutionally. The majority of 
HMC schools rely on fees, lack capital wealth and are provincially located outside South-
East England. However, wealth works relationally. Whilst they are much more distant from 
capital than the wealthy southern schools strongly associated with national elites, northern 
provincial day schools still possess resources that at a local/regional scale offer substantial 
advantages (Gamsu, 2021b). At the apex, four English schools hold and wield vast amounts 
of historically accumulated capital; unlike their exploited state counterparts (Whitfield, 2016) 
these institutions are the subjects not the objects of capital. Just below them on the next 
rung on the ladder is a slightly larger group which are still highly wealthy and adept at 
manipulating different income streams maintain their economic position. Taken together 
these 50-60 schools are culturally and economically extremely powerful. Despite the 
extensive literature on the continuing dominance of these institutions in producing ruling 
elites and the dominance of these institutions in determining what ‘excellence’ looks like in 
education, the material relation to capital is sometimes forgotten. Class power in education is 
strongly associated with capital.  
 
An education in a setting of extreme economic affluence is not ‘the same’ as that 
experienced by those in poorly-funded state education, whatever these elite schools may 
claim (Khan, 2015, p. 68).  This examination of school finances could be applied to elite 
schools elsewhere; in the USA the Eight/Ten Schools’ organizations form larger groupings of 
elite schools with substantial endowment wealth. Beyond that what about Switzerland, 
Sweden, Japan’s new Kaiyo Academy, with its Toyota connections (Sandgren, 2017, pp. 
209-210) or the new Chinese fee-paying schools (Liu 2020)? What relations exist between 
new patterns of capital accumulation and the formation of new elites? We might also explore 
further how these economic dimensions of the field inter-relate with other cultural dimensions 
(attainment, university entry and so on) to apply Bourdieu’s field techniques to contemporary 
inequalities. 
 
Central to this story is the maintenance of prestige, control and dominance over the 
educational field. Capital is used here to exert power over time. If research in this field is to 
play a role in dismantling structural inequality and class power then it must be disruptive. De-
mystifying elite education must take place not simply in the academic field but publicly. We 
cannot simply rehearse analyses of class power for the sake of understanding alone. 
Instead, we should align and embed our work within the construction of movements that can 
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